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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
EFFECT OF MEXICAN DIVORCES IN UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
Well-to-do Americans, eager to sever their marital ties, can always
take up the six-week sojourn in Nevada. But Mexico remains the poor
man's haven. For a comparatively small fee, from $100 to $200,1 one
can obtain a Mexican divorce-merely by writing for it. According to
several typical advertising pamphlets 2 the following advantages are stressed
-no appearance before courts, no witnesses, less cost and no unfavorable
publicity. These pamphlets are sent through the mails to attorneys,
although direct advertising in newspapers, both daily and weekly is
common.
One such advertisement, in the classified section of a large New
York daily,8 offered "Mexican Law Office-free consultation." Upon
inquiry, the interested party received literature,4 a questionnaire, and a
statement of financial terms. The literature, while extolling the virtues of
Mexican divorces, purports to prove to the prospective divorcee that
Mexican divorces are entitled to recognition as a matter of law and that
mutual consent divorces are recognized in every state of the union.,
Such advertising, having finally irritated enough people, resulted in
the introduction of a bill into Congress in 1935 to "prohibit the use of
the mails for the solicitation of the procurement of divorces in foreign
countries." Although subsequently shelved, the bill indicated one method
of attack on the federal level on mail order divorces.6
Although the incidence of Mexican divorces obtained by Americans
is unknown, one source7 estimated in 1929 that over 2,000 had been
granted. Another reports stated that one judge in Ciudad Juarez, Chihua-
hua, granted 2,800 divorces to Americans in a period of 19 months. The
trend has increased rather than decreased judging from the amount of
litigation in American courts that involve Mexican divorces. 9
Thus the validity of Mexican divorces in the United States is a
matter of concern to those who have taken advantage of the easy way to
1. Brt~rsON, The Divorce Mill Advertises, 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
348 (1935).
2. Ibid.
3. New York Daily Mirror, March 15, 1935, p. 4 col. 2.
4. See note 1, supra.
5. Numerous cases are cited to prove this contention, with only one being on
point. For a full discussion see BrGEi.soN, oP. cit. supra 348, 350.
6. 74 CoNe. REc. 727 (1936).
7. Bates, The Divorce of Americans in Mexico, 15 A.B.A.J. 709 (1929).
8. New York Times, April 29, 1934, p. 9, col. 2.
9. Approximately 106 cases have been concerned directly or indirectly with the
validity of Mexican divorces obtained by Americans.
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dissolve their marriages and have re-shaped their lives in reliance upon such
decrees.
The purpose and scope of this comment is limited to a comparative
study of the effect of such divorces in American courts as delineated in
the cases litigating the issue.
CENERALLY
Mexican divorces can be divided into three main categories. The
best known type is of course the mail order divorce. As shown before,
one or both of the parties authorizes, by letter, a Mexican lawyer to appear
on his behalf before a Mexican state court. The attorney is able to perform
the legal sleight of hand of obtaining a decree by the Mexican state laws
designed expressly for this purpose. The party or parties remain at their
respective residences and receive the necessary decrees, again by mail.
No effort, and most of the time, very little legal effect is involved.
A variant of this procedure involves the personal appearance of one
of the parties, who stays over a period of time ranging from one afternoon
to several weeks, obtains the decree and departs. The personal appearance
is usually made to simulate domicile. It involves more effort, with a slight
legal effect in a few situations.
Yet another method uses the personal appearance of both parties or,
a personal appearance by one and an appearance by an attorney for the
other. This involves considerable effort but also has some legal effect.
Before delving into the effect of Mexican divorces in American
courts, a consideration of comparative divorce law is necessary for adequate
background information.
COMPARATIVE DIVORCE JURISDICTIONAL LAW-AMERICAN
To avoid immersion in the quagmire of the divorce status among the
several states, only the broad general trends as indicated in several recent
leading cases will be discussed.
The first Williams case'0 upheld a Nevada divorce on the finding
that one spouse was domiciled in Nevada, where that state's finding of
domicile was not questioned, though the other spouse had neither
appeared nor been served with process in Nevada.
North Carolina took up the challenge in the second Williams case,"
and re-examined the question of domicile, finding there was none. Thus
the Nevada divorce was not entitled to full faith and credit.
Both Williams cases, as well as all American divorces, stand under
the shadow of the Full Faith and Credit clause.12  These cases affirmed
10. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
11. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
12. U.S, CONST. ART. IV, § 1, "Full Faith and Credit shall be given to the public
acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state."
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the concept that domicile, the holy of holies in establishing any Anglo-
American divorce jurisdiction, 13 is a prerequisite for the application of
full faith and credit. Thus, an ex parte decree by a sister-state is not
conclusive as to a finding of domicile and may, as a rule, be re-examined.
However, if the defendant appears or participates in the proceedings,
the requirements of full faith and credit will bar a re-examination of the
jurisdictional question.14  In this connection it should be noted that
jurisdiction to dissolve the marital status has been distinguished from
jurisdiction to affect financial obligations resulting from marriage.' 5 Even
a third party collateral attack on a sister-state divorce where the defendant
appeared by attorney, is barred where the party attacking would not have
been permitted to make a collateral attack in the courts of the granting
state.18
Since participation in a divorce proceeding by the other spouse
renders it valid for all practical purposes, it has been said that this
amounts to compulsory recognition of a divorce obtained by mutual
consent.'7  There is no determination that the court had jurisdiction;
rather it prevents the participating spouse from subsequently questioning
that jurisdiction.
The burden of undermining the decree of a sister-state rests heavily
on the assailant. The decree is entitled to a presumption of validity
unless shown otherwise. 8
Under due process, 8" our concepts of jurisdictional power have received
constitutional sanction to the extent that a judgment rendered in one state
without an adequate basis of jurisdiction is void even in the state which
rendered it, as well as in the sister-state where recognition is sought.'9
COMPARATIVE DIVORCE LAW-MEXICAN
The United States of Mexico is a federal republic composed of
28 states, two federal territories and the federal district of Mexico City.
Federal law is applicable in the federal district and territories, but each of
13. For a full discussion see Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction, 65 IIARV. L. REv. 193
1951); Chesire, int'l Validity of Divorces, 61 L.Q.R. 352 (1945), Chediak, Validez delas Sentencias de Divorcio Dictadas por Tribunalez Extranjeros, 21 REVISTA CUBANA DE
DfEECHO 37 (Cuba 1947).
14. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
15, Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) (Wife obtained a separate maintenance
and support decree in New York. Husband later obtained ex Parte Nevada divorce
decree. The court held that Nevada had no right to alter wife's rights under the New
York iudgment, which was a property interest. The Nevada decree did not wipe out
alimony claims accrued before or after).
16. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
17. Id., 65 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1951).
18. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951).
18a. U.S. CONST. AMEND). XIV, § 1.
19. Overton, Sister State Divorces, 22 TENN. L. REv. 891 (1953).
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the 28 states has its own body of civil law. Some have adopted the
federal codes and laws, although there is still a great variety.20
Mexico has been a staunch Catholic country and marriage was viewed
as an indissoluble Sacrament-the traditional attitude of canon law since
the Council of Trent in 1560.21 But Venustiano Carranza, first chief
of the constitutional armies, modified previous legislation 22 by providing
for absolute divorce for valid cause or by mutual consent,23 in 1915. In
contemplation of subsequent trends, a later enactment 24 expressly set
forth that to prevent foreigners and residents of the Mexican states from
taking advantage of the law it was incumbent upon the parties to have
resided for one year within the territorial jurisdiction of a competent
court, although this has been reduced to six months.24a Grounds for
divorce in the Federal Civil Code are varied, but interpretation has been
so liberal that practically any marital offense can be used as the basis of a
cause of action.
25
Foreigners in Mexico may be divorced according to the causes and
procedures of each of the states if they reside there, according to the
Federal Civil Code.26 The states have been more than willing to enable
foreigners to take advantage of their laws.
The pioneer in this field was Yucatan, for as early as 1918, it had
adopted "iconoclastic" legislation designed to expedite divorce. 7  Other
states, noting the revenue-producing potentialities, soon followed. The
20. Stem, Mexican Marriages and Divorces, 20 CAL. S.B.J. 53 (1945); Galindez,
El divorcio en el derecho de Americas, 2 BOLETIN DEL INSTITUTO DE DERECHO COM-
PARADO 10, 13, 38 (Mexico 1949) (contains a complete list of Mexican state laws
relating to divorce and lists Mexican cases concerning foreigner's divorces).
21. Bates, The Divorce of Americans in Mexico, 15 A.B.AJJ., 709, 712 (1929).
22. Under the old Federal Civil Code, divorce did not dissolve the matrimonial
ties, it merely "suspended some of the civil obligations." Id., 20 CAL. S.B.J. 53, 55(1945h.\ Mexico: CoDiFicAcoN DE Los DECRETOS del C. Venustiano Carranza, 147
(1915 4 Mexico: LAws oF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, April 9, 1917, Art. 106.
24a. Mexico: FEDERAL CIVIL CODE, Art. 29-31 (1932); See Schoenrich, THE
CIVIL CODE OF MExIco 9 (1950); Arce, MANUEL DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL
PaIVhDO MEXICANO 392 (Mexico 1943).
25. Grounds for divorce include: adultery of either spouse; child conceived
illegitimately before marriage; proposal by the husband to prostitute the wife- incitement
to crime by one spouse; corruption of children; incurable impotency, syphillis, tuber-
culosis, etc.; incurable insanity for the past two years; unjustified absence from home for
over six months; absence from home for one year if motivated by cause justifying divorce;
legally declared disappearance or presumption of death; cruelty, threats, or serious insults;
non-support; slanderous accusations if spouse slandered is guilty of crime punishable by
two year's imprisonment; commission of non-political but infamous crime; inveterate
gambling, drunkenness, or drug addiction; an act by one spouse against the person or
proprty of the other, which if committed by a third person would be punishable by
at least one year's imprisonment, mutual consent, with over one year of marriage.
(Divorce by mail is out of the question in the Federal district, since both must appear
personally in mutual consent divorces).
26. 9 Anales de Jurisprudencia del D.F. 836; Civil Court V.D.F. (June 18, 1935).
27. Cartwright, Yucatan Divorces, 18 A.B.A.J. 307 (1932).
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extreme liberality of these laws has acted as a magnet for the thousands
of Americans anxious to dissolve their marriages.28
The question arises as to how, under Mexican state law, foreigners
can obtain a divorce by mail or one-day appearance. A fairly typical state,
by way of illustration, is Chihuahu. In that state, jurisdiction in a contested
divorce is at the place of residence of the plaintiff. Jurisdiction may also
be established by express or implied submission .29 A constructive domicile
is recognized. The entry of the plaintiff's name in the municipal register
of the seat of the court suffices for the establishment of domicile for
purposes of a divorce action.")
Practices of the states such as the above have not gone without
reprimand from federal courts. It has been held that Yucatan divorces,
granted in the absence of mutual consent and without valid cause, infringe
the guarantees of the due process clause of the Mexican constitution.3 1
A divorce has been invalidated if service was not made on a non-resident
in accordance with the laws of the latter's domicile .32  Service by publication
was barred in Morelos if the plaintiff did not know the whereabouts of
the defendant but could have discovered it.33 The Mexican Supreme
Court has held statutes of Campeche, similar to those of Chihuahua noted
above, unconstitutional where jurisdiction was conferred on an administra-
tive official of the Civil Registry to determine residence.
34
But under the Mexican system of jurisprudence, these decisions do
not have the force of precedent and the courts of most Mexican states
have continued to grant divorces to Americans on the basis of Mexican
state law.35 For a decision to result in binding precedent, it is necessary
that the Mexican Supreme Court hand down five decisions on the
same point. 0 The determination of whether a decision is defective is a
problem of constitutional law to be interpreted by the Mexican Supreme
Court, although their decisions are entitled to the same respect, possibly,
as obiter dicta of the United States Supreme Court.37
28. 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 310 (1935).
29. Mexico: LAw or FAMILY RELATIONS, Art. 22, 23 (1933).
30. "Residence shall be proved by the official act of the municipal registry."
Mexico: LAw or FAMILY RELATIONS, Art. 24 (1933).
31. 18 Semanario Judicial de ]a Federacion, 5a ep6ca 631 (1927); S.J. 5 ep6ca
1556 (1933).
32. 33 S.J. 5 ep6ca 977 (1933) (This forces the plaintiff to serve the defendant
according to the laws of the matrimonial domicile and not according to the easy require-
ments of the lIx fori).
33. 42 S.1. 160 (1934); 14 La Justicia 6888 (1944).
34. 7 BOLETIN DE INFORNIACION JUDICIAL 466 (1951).
35. Id., 20 CAL. S.B. J. 53, 57 (1945).
36. 2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 310 (1935).
37. Ibid., See Mason, Mexico's Cash and Carry Divorce for Americans, 88
SCRIBNERtS 360 (930) ("We should remember that the whole theory of Mexican
jurisprudence al government is different. Believing in a complete separation of
judicial and legislative functions, Mexicans view with gicat repugnance such powers as
the United States Supreme Court wields").
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The Mexican government itself has taken a dim view of the divorce
procedures of the states. A circular was sent to Mexican consuls in 1933,11
which urged them to disregard solicitations of a Mexican attorney who
tried to obtain help from the consuls.
Although no mail order divorce has been litigated in Mexico, it- is
not certain if submission to the jurisdicton of the court by mail would
be considered sufficient by the Supreme Court of Mexico,39 It would seem
reasonably safe to assume, from the cases mentioned above, that the
trend of the Mexican judiciary is toward an elimination of the lax
practices of the states.40
EFFECT OF MEXICAN DIVORCES IN THE UNITED STATES
Recognition in sister-states of divorces obtained in a court in the
United States is governed by the Full Faith and Credit clause. Because
of lack of legislative power in the Congress, there can be no federal statute
concerning recognition of divorces obtained in foreign countries. Although
other means might be employed, either by executive treaty-making power
or by control of the mails, 4' only state law (case-law and statutes) may
regulate the effect of foreign nation divorces in the United States.
Generally, judgments of foreign nations are not open to re-examination
on the merits when litigated before a local court-because of comity, a
word "of loose and uncertain meaning at best. It has little significance
other than as a statement of the conflicts rules of the forum."4 2
But foreign nation decrees may well be re-examined to question the
jurisdiction of the rendering court as has been done in almost all of
the cases litigating Mexican divorces. 43
38. 61 BOUSTIN OFICIAL DE LA SECRETARIA lDE RELAGIONES EXTERIORES 102(Oct. 1933).
39. 2 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 310 (1935).
40. In 1941 the Tlaxcala state legislature abolished an earlier divorce law "because
its immorality has given cause to unfortunate opinions which damage the prestige and
traditions of the state." Id., 20 CAL. S.B.J. 53, 57 (1945); In addition, a decree of
the State of Morelos orders state judges to comply, in all divorce proceedings, strictly
with the provisions of the new civil code of 1945 and rules of civil procedure stating
expressly that the divorce law of 1934 was motivated by reasons of revenue and has,
therefore, permitted "unscrupulous lawyers and litigants to take advantage of the benignity
of its procedure . . . (but) the Supreme Court of the Nation by its several amparo judg-
ments set aside such divorce decrees and, by so doing, gave sufficient ground to hold
such proceedings unlawful . . . as being in flagrant violation of the right of fair trial
under due process, a guarantee contained in our Constitution." The decree points out,
in conclusion, that the "loss of prestige suffered by the judiciary of the State of Morelos
has reached beyond the boundaries of our country, which practices have to be erased
forever, thus rehabilitating the State of Morelos in this respect so that it shall enjoy the
confidence of society in protecting the marriage bond as a basis of the sovereignty of
the Fatherland and of the well-being of the Mexican people." Morelos: Law of
June 6, 1952, [1952] PEIIODIcO OICIAI. 1504, no. 66 (Mexico).
41. See note 6 supra.
42. Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COL.
L. REv. 783, 784 (1950).
43. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Gir. 1954); Wells v. Wells, 230
Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 (1935); Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark, 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043
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MAIL ORDER DIVORCES
The best known type of decree by Mexican state courts is the divorce
secured by mail." The earliest cases litigating mail order divorces have
developed a method of attack and used language that prevails down to
the most recent cases. Despite the result desired, from annulment 4" to
an action for divorce,"6 the outcome is the same-practically no legal
effect.
The facts are the same in most mail order divorces. The appearance
through attorney by one or both sides if there is mutual agreement 4 7 with
no personal appearance causes the obvious judicial reaction. In an early
case,48 a mail order divorce was held invalid because of lack of jurisdiction
of the parties or over the subject matter. It could not be obtained by
means of legislation granting jurisdiction without the consent of he
state where the law is allowed to operate. Since both spouses were
residents of New York, the court felt they were subject to all laws of
the state, and in securing the Mexican divorce, they violated the law,
procedure and public policy of New York.
Another mail order divorce was subjected to much the same language
with the court pointing out that since sister-state decrees may be denied
recognition because of lack of domicile, the rule becomes even stronger
when applied to foreign nation judgments especially if that nation's
jurisprudence is not based on the common law.49
Such divorces have been termed a nullity,50 as being void ab initio,'
or perpetrating a fraud5 2 on the court. Although there is sometimes
(1936); Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App.2d 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1934); Newton v Newton
13 N.J. Misc. 617, 179 Atl. 621 (Ch. 1935); Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356 68 P.2d
028 (1937); Ruderman v. Ruderman, 193 Misc. 85, 82 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. dt. 1949)
af'd., 275 App. Div. 834, 89 N.YS.2d 894 (1st. Dep't 1949); Wynn v. Wynn, 66
N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Lent v. Lent, 49 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. 1944);
Coakley v. Coakley, 161 Misc. 867, 293 N.Y. Supp. 421 (Sup. Ct. 1937); Bobala v
Bobala, 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940); De Rosay v. De Rosay, 162 Pa. Super.
3;3, 57 A.2d 685 (1948).
44, For a full description, see text, MONr.
45. Brown v. Brown, 282 App. Div. 726, 122 N.Y.S.2d 411 (2nd Dep't 1953
af('d., 306 N.Y. 788, 118 N.E.2d 603 (1953); Drybrough v. Drybrough, 87 N.Y.S.2d
153 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Sandberg v. Sandberg, 54 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Lotz
v. Lotz, 49 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418
(Sup. Ct. 1938).
46. Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Cal. App.2d 148, 89 P.Zd 404 (1939); Newitt v. Newitt,
282 App. Div. 81, 121 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1st Dep't 1953); Lent v. Lent, 49 N.Y.S.2d 569(Sup. Ct. 1944); Massacar v. Massacar, 37 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Newins v.
Newins, 13 N.Y.S.Zd 377 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
47. Drybrough v. Drybrough, 87 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
48. Alzman v. Muher, 23. App. Div. 139, 210 N.Y. Supp. 60 (Sup. Ct. 1930)
(Mandamus proceeding to compel city clerk to issue marriage license to plaintiff who
offered Mexican divorce from prior marriage).
49. Greenspan v. Greenspan, 19 N.I'. Misc. 153, 18 A.2d 283 (Ch. 1941).
50. Newins v. Newins, 13 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
51. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 174 Misc. 906, 22 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Dom. Rel, 1940).
52. Stewart v. Stewart, 32 Cal. App. 148, 89 P.2d 404 (1939).
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personal service on the other spouse, this has not seemed to influence
most of the decisions and service by publication has been held im-
material.53
PERSONAL APPEARANCE
Personal appearance by one or both of the parties does not, in the
majority of cases, validate a Mexican divorce. Much the same approach
is used as in the mail order situations with the exception that the courts
are prone to go to great lengths in examining the question of domicile.
The orthodox viewpoint of domicile usually governs and a recital of
domicile in the decree, with few exceptions, does not change the outcome
of the decisions.
In one of the earliest cases, 4 the husband had appeared in Yucatan
and obtained a divorce there. The New York court pointed out its
right to inquire into the question of domicile, Since there was nothing
to show in the record, that the husband was ever legally domiciled in
Mexico, the only evidence being a recital in the decree of residence,
the divorce was held invalid. Another typical situation occurred where
both husband and wife left their car on the American side of the Inter-
national Bridge to avoid delay and obtained a Mexican divorce after an
afternoon's visit across the border. Despite the usual recitals of the
jurisdictional fact of domicile or residence the decree did not prevent
the wife from bringing a subsequent divorce action in New Mexico. The
court said, "To permit a foreign state or nation to assume jurisdiction over
residents of this state and grant a divorce on request, like a slot machine
in which you deposit a fixed sum of money, press the lever and out
comes a decree, is a condition which New Mexico does not yet tolerate."55
Despite the length of the personal appearances, which ranges from
forty hours56 to nine days57 or more, American courts apply the law of
the forum in determining the fact of domicile, and for the most part
find that the requisite residence plus intent was not present.58 A California
53. Ohlson v. Ohlson, 54 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1945); But see, In re Nolan's Estate,
56 Ariz. 361, 108 P.2d 388 (1940).
54. Bonner v. Reandrew, 203 Iowa 1355, 214 N.W. 536 (1927) (Action for
alienation of affections); Cf., Wells v. Wells, 230 Ala. 430, 161 So. 794 (1935)
(Mexican decree did not recite that the husband was a resident).
55. Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928, 936 (1937).
56. Hodge v. Hodge, 80 F. Supp. 379 (D.C. 1948) (Action for support and
maintenance).
57. Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936) (Additional
reason given by court for non-recognition was that "incompatibility of temperament"
was not a ground for divorce in Arkansas).
58. Newton v. Newton, 13 N.J. Misc. 617, 179 At]. 621 (Ch. 1935) (Husband
was in Mexico for less than a week "for sole purpose of obtaining a divorce"); Imbriosca
v. Quayle, 278 App. Div. 144, 103 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1st Dep't. 1951) rev'g., 197 Misc.
1049, 96 N.Y.S.2d 635 (Sup. Ct. 1950) aff'd., 303 N.Y. 841, 104 N.E.2d 378 (1952)
(Deceased took two-week vacation, six-week leave of absence, and secured a Mexican
divorce, and then returned to his New York job); Ruderman v. Ruderman, 193 Misc.
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court said that a foreign divorce obtained through simulated residence
and not in good faith is open to attack.59
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Often one spouse tries to enjoin the other spouse from going through
with foreign divorce proceedings or desires a determination of the marital
status. In the first instance the courts must consider the effect of a
future decree while in the second they consider the effect of a past decree.
In the first case ever to litigate a Mexican divorce 0 the wife sought
to enjoin her husband from continuing Mexican divorce proceedings. He
was a New York resident who had made a personal appearance in Mexico
for the express purpose of obtaining a divorce there. As a defense to
her action, he admitted the invalidity of the Mexican divorce and in
effect, asked the court why he should be enjoined from going ahead
with an admittedly useless act. The court replied that this was an
attempt to evade the laws of New York. If allowed to continue he
might feel that he was free to remarry. His wife would then have to
go to the expense of fighting the Mexican decree. There would also
be an invasion of her rights by having a husband with one wife in New
York and one in Mexico.
The opposite conclusion has been reached in several recent cases, 61
on the theory that the plaintiff had nothing to fear from the other
spouse's action since the Mexican courts were wholly without jurisdiction
to grant a valid decree. They thus denied relief to the plaintiff. Another
recent case,62 however, enjoined the husband from obtaining a divorce
in another state, after he had been granted a Mexican divorce. The
court held that it would be illogical to refuse relief because the Mexican
divorce was invalid. "We ought to destroy the entire false situation.' 'oaa
Although seemingly not the basis of the decisions, those cases which
have granted injunctive relief have involved appearance by one spouse
in the Mexican divorce, while injunctive relief was denied where mail
order divorces were involved.
When a determination of the marital status is sought by one spouse,
85, 82 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (Husband was in Mexico on a student's visa,
renewable yearly); Coin. ex rel. Allison v. Allison,, 151 Pa. Super. 369, 30 A.2d 365
(1943) (Husband in Mexico for one day); Corn. ex rel. Manzi v. Manzi, 120 Pa. Super.
360, 182 Atl. 795 (1936) (Husband "temporarily sojourned" in Mexico).
59. Ryder v. Ryder, 2 Cal. App. 426, 37 P.2d 1069 (1934).
60. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dep't
1926).
61. Newman v. Newman, 181 -Misc. 256, 44 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
Armetta v. Armetta, 68 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1947) (Relied on Newman decision).
62. Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 111 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
62a d., at 996, 111 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
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the courts are usually quick to render a declaratory judgment because
it "impairs, injures, and misrepresents the marital status of the plaintiff.1'63
On the other hand, a declaratory judgment has been held unnecessary
where a prior injunction prevented the spouse from completing a Mexican
mail order proceeding, which even if completed would be ineffectual
to dissolve the marital status. 4
OTHER EFFECTS
Mexican divorces have fared no better in the federal courts than
they have in the state courts. State law is examined to determine the
validity of the Mexican divorce where it was necessary to determine the
beneficiary in National Service Insurance policies 5 or for Social Security
Board " claims. Lack of domicile is found in these cases as well as in
cases affecting the marital status brought in the District of Columbia. 1
The United States Court of Appeals has also had occasion to rule on
a Mexican divorce. It has held that despite a six-week sojourn in Mexico,
a bona fide domicile was never acquired and that the "Mexican divorce
decree, therefore, is utterly lacking in extraterritorial validity." G8
In applications for citizenship that depend on the validity of the
Mexican divorce to sever a former marriage, the courts have refused
recognition because of the usual lack of domicile to establish jurisdiction.69
However, a different result is reached in petitions for naturalization, where
although the prior Mexican divorce was invalid, this did not prevent the
petitioner from being a person of good moral character for purposes of
63. Baumann v. Baumann, 132 Misc. 217, 221, 228 N.Y. Supp. 539, 543 (Sup.
Ct. 1928) aff'd., without opinion, 224 App. Div. 719, 229 N.Y. Supp. 833 (1st Dep't
1928) modified on other grounds, 250 N.Y. 382, 165 N.E. 819 (1929); Accord, Her.
hammer v. Herhammer, 129 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Robinson v. Robinson,
94 N1Y'.S.2d 806 (1949); Wynn v, Wynn, 188 Misc. 425, 66 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct.
1946); Hirsch v. Hirsch, 51 N.Y.S.2d 432 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Devletian v. Devietian,
51 N.S.Y.2d 431 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
64. Pantelides v. Pantelides, 54 N.Y.S.2d 841 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
65. United States v. Synder, 177 F.2d 44 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Muir v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
66. Magner v. Hobby, 215 F.2d 190 (2nd Cir. 1954); Atwater v. Ewing, 86
F. Supp. 47 (E.D.N.Y. 1949). Contra: Drew v. flobby, 123 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
67. Garman v. Garman, 70 App. D.C. 4, 102 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (Prior
mail order decree invalid in new divorce action); Cover v. Mattingly, 62 Wash. L. Rep.
967 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (Prior mail order divorce invalid in annulment action).
68. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571, 573 (4th Cir. 1954) (The court cites
the second Williams case for this statement, even though that case is authority only for
inter-state divorce matters under the Full Faith and Credit clause); ef., Magner v. Hobby,
215 F.2d 190, 193 (2nd Cir. 1954) (Here the court correctly distinguishes between
foreign and sister-state divorces).
69. Taffel's Petition, 49 F. Supp. 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (Wife denied divorce
petition since husband's prior mail order divorce invalid); Petition of Morss, 37 N.Y.S.2d
298 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (Prior mail order divorce invalid).
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naturalization,70 nor render a spouse morally unfit in actions for custody
or adoption. 71
Even where invalidation of a prior Mexican mail order divorce would
result in a conviction of bigamy because of a second marriage, the courts
have not hesitated to invalidate, 2 although one court held that if to hold
otherwise would convict, slight evidence would support exoneration of
the parties. 73
Payments made pursuant to a separation agreement executed with
a Mexican divorce which was probably void were said to be income to
the wife and deductible by the husband.74
FULL RECOGNITION
It can not be said that all divorces obtained in Mexico by Americans
have been given no legal effect by our courts. Although the cases heretofore
cited have certainly indicated the strong majority policy of non-recognition,
a minority of decisions has accorded Mexican divorces some legal effect,
including full recognition.
In the cases that have declared the Mexican divorce valid, there
has been a personal appearance by either both parties, or personal
appearance by one and appearance through an attorney by the other
spouse.
The first case to fully recognize a Mexican decree held that where
both parties appeared personally, and the Mexican court's jurisdictional
competency was shown in the decree by a recital of domicile of both
parties, it was New York's duty to recognize the jurisdiction of the Mexican
court. "We must accept the conclusion of the Mexican courts upon the
intent to domicile. . . ."71 The parties had made a one day appearance,
obtaining residence certificates from the Mayor's office which stated
that their names were inscribed in the Municipal Register, and received
their decree the same day. The court took judicial notice of the fact
that under Chihuahua law residence can be fixed by either party and
proven by the certificate.
70. Petition of R -. , 56 F. Supp. 969 (D. C. Mass. 1944) (Even though
petitioner might have committed fornication under Massachusetts laws, her good faith
marriage to a man who had previously secured an invalid Mexican mail order divorce
was not something to be regarded as reprehensible); Petition of Haverly, 180 Misc. 16,
42 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (Here petitioner had secured, the Mexican divorce
and re-married. The court held that she was not of 'bad moral character").
71. In re Adoption of D.S., 107 Cal. App.2d 211, 236 P.2d'821 (1951); Com.
ex rel., Thompson v. Yarnell, 313 Pa. 244, 169 Atl. 370 (1933).
72. People v. Harlow, 9 Cal. App. 2d 643, 50 P.2d 1052 (1935); State v. Najjar,
I N.J. Super. 208, 63 A.2d 807 (1949).
73. Ferret v. Ferret, 55 N.M. 565, 237 P.2d 594 (1951).
74. G.C.M, 25250 1947-18-12630 (Reasoning was that Congress required some
decree as evidence that the parties were not using the agreement as an income-splitting
device. Since the spouses remarried in reliance on the decree, it was doubtful that they
went through the procedure merely to avoid taxes).
75 Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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Later cases"6 used the same approach; that is, upon personal appear-
ance by one or both or appearance by attorney by the other, coupled
with a recital of domicile or residence to establish jurisdiction, the decree
is granted recognition, and collateral attacks by one of the spouses or
by a third party is barred. The tone of these cases indicates that the
Mexican divorces are recognized under a combination of two theories;
one being that if the decree is valid under Mexican laws, it will be
considered valid in New York by comity, and that appearance by the
defending spouse, either personally or through an attorney, offers that
spouse an opportunity to question the apparent lack of domicile?7  Even
property or alimony settlements embodied in these valid Mexican decrees
have been held to be enforceable.78
BURDEN OF PROOF
Some Mexican divorces have been accorded recognition by failure
to sustain the burden of proof. In absence of evidence to the. contrary,
some courts find a presumption of good faith and integrity of the judgment
of a foreign court, and although fraud may be the basis of attack, it
must be proved.79 The burden is on one who attacks a second marriage 0
as well as to sustain the claim of lack of domicile 1 where there was
abundant evidence showing intent to reside in Mexico.
Several courts have pointedly met the burden of proof by examining
the Mexican decree's status under Mexican law and incidentally displaying
a knowledge of Mexican procedure that has been all too rare in other cases.
In one situation,8 2 the evidence showed that the plaintiff had falsely
registered as a resident under Chihuahua laws and thus Georgia would
not validate a decree wherein jurisdiction had been conferred by the
76. Caswell v. Caswell, 1Il N.Y. Supp. 875 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Mountain v.
Mountain, 109 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Misc. 73,
85 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1949); In re Fleischer's Estate, 192 Misc. 777, 80 N.Y.S.2d
543 (Suf. Ct. 1948).
77. This might be considered as extending the Sherrer doctrine to foreign nation
divorces. See Drew v. Hobby, 123 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (Action for social
security benefits in which the court felt that personal appearance by both spouses was
not contrary to public policy of New York in light of cases cited in notes 75, 76 supra).
78. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Misc. 73, 85 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (Al-
though enforceable, alimony arrears under New York rules must be reduced to judgment);
In re Fleischer's Estate, 192 Misc. 777, 80 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Surr. Ct. 1948) Enforceable
separation agreement would in itself have prevented first wife from sharing in the
estate); But cf., Deshlar v. Rivas, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1951) aff'd., 280 App.
Div. 775, 113 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1st Dep't 1952) (Since agreement also provided for
procurement of Mexican divorce, it was void and against public policy although no refusal
to enforce Mexican decree).
79. Galloway v. Galloway, 116 Cal. App. 478, 2 P.2d 842 (1931) (Action for
separate maintenance); Com. ex rat., Thompson v. Yamell, 313 Pa. 244, 169 At. 370
(1933 1.5 In re Adoption of D.S., 107 Cal. App. 2d 211, 236 P.2d 821 (1951).
81. De Young v. De Young, 27 Cal. App.2d 521, 165 P.2d 457 (1946).
82. Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944) (Mail order
decree).
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parties. Where a decree did not contain a formal declaration of execution
as required by the laws of Chihuahua, it was only an interlocutory
decree 83 and not a final and conclusive determination of the status of
the parties as required by California procedure.8 4
ESTOPPEL
Ordinarily the term estoppel "connotes the denial to a party of the
right to prove a fact to the detriment of his opponent, who had relied
on that fact . . and changed his legal position accordingly."' 5
However a quasi-estoppel doctrine relying on equitable principles
has been developed to preclude a challenge of sister-state divorces86 as
well as that of foreign nations. The doctrine may be invoked regardless
of the belief of one spouse in the validity of the decree or of any change
in the position of the other spouse.8 7
The application of the above has been, to say the least, uncertain.
The problem presented to the courts, while somewhat difficult to solve
on legalistic principles, becomes even more difficult to resolve when
considered along equitable lines. If viewed along strictly legal rules,
a Mexican decree does not even have any color of validity and is absolutely
void. 8 But if guided by equitable maxims, the situation of the spouse
who obtained or participated in a void Mexican divorce and then attempts
to disregard it by suing for divorce in New York, illustrates that be comes
into court with unclean hands,"' or is attempting to profit by his own
wrongdoing.00
'Those cases in which the participating spouse was estopped from
challenging the validity of the Mexican decree are relatively few in
number. The courts are careful to point out that the Mexican decree is
invalid for lack of domicile to establish jurisdiction. It makes no difference
whether the spouse, being estopped, instituted the Mexican proceedings,,"
participated as a defendant, 2 or as a third person was merely instrumental
83. In re Cleland's Estate, 119 Cal. App.2d 18, 258 P.2d 1097 (1953) (Determi-
nation of surviving widow).
84. CALIFOR.UA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 1915, (Only a "final decree" of
a foreign country having jurisdiction according to the laws of such country, shall have
the same effect as in the country where rendered and also the same effect as finaljudgments rendered in California).
85 Lenhoff, Rationale of the Recognition of Foreign Divorces in New York, 16
FoRn L. REv. 231 (1947).
86. In re Ellis' Estate, 55 Minn. 401, 412, 413, 56 N. W. 1056, 1059, 1060(1893); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 204 App. Div. 116, 197 N.Y. Supp. 371 (4th Dep't. 1922)
aff'd., 237 N.Y. 520, 143 N.E. 726 (1922); Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N.E.2d
290 (1940).
87. Id., 16 FORD L. REV. 231, 233 (1947).
88. See notes 50-52 supra.
89. Tonti v. Chadwick, 1 N.J. 531, 64 A.2d 436 (1949).
90. Weber v. Weber, 135 Misc. 717, 238 N.Y. Supp. 333 (1929).
91. Fisher v. Fisher, 162 Misc. 775, 295 N.Y. Supp. 451 (1937).
92. See note 90 supra.
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in aiding one spouse in the procuring of the Mexican decree. 3 One
court summed up its position by pointing out that not to allow estoppel
would be a "flagrant invitation to others to attempt to circumvent the
law, cohabit in an unlawful state and when tired, apply to the courts
for a release from the indicia of the marital status."' 4
In those decisions which after a lengthy discussion, have rejected
the estoppel argument, there has been a distinction made between a
private claim and a determination of the marital status in the public
interest. Where the marital status is involved, the courts have refused
an estoppel9 5 although barring the other spouse from pleading the invalidity
of the Mexican decree where a private claim was involved. 6
Another distinction is made where the courts point out that there
is not the slightest semblance or color of jurisdiction in mail order
decrees, since the spouses have never submitted nor invoked the jurisdiction
of the Mexican courts as we understand it. The spouse who obtains the
Mexican decree engages in no deception of the court and perpetrates
no fraud. He never alleges or claims domicile in Mexico.9 7  Nor would
that spouse be acting inconsistently with a position taken in a prior
decreeY8
As a result of a strict interpretation of a New York statute,019 a spouse
who obtained a Mexican mail order decree was precluded because of
93 Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App.2d 657, 161 P2d 490 (1945) (In action for
annulment, plaintiff had helped spouse procure mail order decree from prior mate. The
court felt that one who has invoked a court's jurisdiction cannot now plead that court's
lack of jurisdiction. But, it is submitted that the plaintiff had not himself invoked thejurisdiction of the Mexican court. He had merely helped someone else invoke thatjurisdiction); Weiss v. Hughes, 1 N.J. Super. 104, 62 A.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (In
action for annulment, plaintiff was estopped after relying on Mexican mail order decree
to marry the defendant, who had herself obtained that divorce. "He was aware of the
manner in which his wife dissolved her previous marriage" and thus was now barred
from pleading the invalidity of the Mexican decree).
94. Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App.2d 657, 661, 161 P.2d 490, 494 (1945); See
Smith v. Smith 72, Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943) (Dissenting opinion); Carman
v. Carman, 70 App. D.C. 4, 102 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (Dissenting opinion).
95. In re Hensgen, 80 Cal. App.2d 78, 80, 181 P.2d 69, 71 (1947) (Determina-
tion of the marital status of parties claiming right of appointment as administratrix);Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423 (1943) (In divorce action. court held
that although a void foreign decree precludes the spouse from asserting a private claim it
will have rio effect on the right of either spouse to a full adjudication of the question
of the existing marital status); Risk v. Risk, 169 Misc. 287, 7 N.Y.S.2d 418 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
96. Hensgen v. Silberman, 87 Cal. App.2d 668, 197 P.2d 356 (1948) (Suit by
first wife to recover community property from second wife accumulated during second
marriage); Dor v. Dorm, 112 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (Action for balance of
support payments under separation agreement); But 4., Magner v. Hobby, 215 F.2d 190,
194, 195 (2nd Cir. 1954) (Query-what is a private claim?).
97. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948) (Action for
support and maintenance); Garman v. Carman, 70 App. D.C. 4, 102 F.2d 272 (D.C.
Cir. 1939).
98. Johnson v. Johnson, 26 N.Y.S.2d. 942 (1941).
99. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAw, § 87(b), "no share. . .to a spouse who has
procured without . .New York a final decree or judgment. . .where such decree orjudgment is not recognized as valid by the laws of this state."
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that decree when she claimed a share in the estate of the husband.'00
The court held that there could be no distinction for purposes of this
act between invalid decrees of sister-states and void Mexican mail order
divorces. Although invalid sister-state decrees result in an estoppel,
void Mexican decrees do not ordinarily have even that effect; and the
language of the act precluded the plaintiff of a share in the estate.
UNETHICAL CONDUCT
Mexican divorces have not only affected the parties involved, but
have been the cause of disciplinary actions by state bar associations against
attorneys who have participated in obtaining such decrees.
A ruling by the Professional Ethics Committee of the American Bar
Association in 1942's' held that "it is illegal and unethical" for attorneys
to participate and aid in the procuring of admittedly illegal Mexican
mail order divorces for New York residents.
Although there were other grounds for such measures, New York
attorneys have been warned, 02 and suspended' 03 and a New Jersey
attorney disbarred 04 for aiding in the procurement of Mexican mail order
divorces.
One court said, "We condemn as unethical the participation of a
lawyer in, or his giving aid to, the procurement of mail order divorces."'' 05'
CONCLUSION
Apart from its nuisance value, a Mexican divorce not based on
adequate jurisdiction by American standards has little effect when tested
in American courts.
The chances of the Mexican decree being given some weight in
the United States, although relatively slight, increase with the jurisdictional
contacts between the Mexican court and the parties involved.
Disregarding jurisdictional requirements, a Mexican decree which would
otherwise be void, should have the logical effect at least of estopping
100. In re Rathscheck's Estate, 300 N.Y. 346, 90 N.E.2d 887, (1950), rev'g, 275
App. Div. 363, 89 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1st Dep't. 1949), aff'g, 194 Misc. 446, 80 N.Y.S.2d 622(Su. Ct. 1949).
101. 29 A.B.AJ. 239 (1942).
102. In ro Anonymous, 274 App, Div. 89, 80 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1st Dep't. 1948) (At-
torney accepted retainer to procure Mexican mail order divorce for New York residents.
Court said that repetition "of like conduct in the future will be deemed sufficient basis
for appropriate disciplinary action").
103. In re Comez Franco, 274 App. Div. 56, 80 N.Y.S.2d 87 (lst Dep't 1948);
Reinstatement granted, 83 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1st Dep't 1948) (Attorney suspended three
months for, among other things, being guilty of unprofessional conduct for participating
in and aiding in the procurement of Mexican mail order divorce).
104. In re Cohen, 10 N.J. 601, 93 A.2d 4 (1952) (Attorney guilty of other
"flagrant transgressions, which apart from his actions in obtaining the Mexican decrees,
merit severe discipline").
105. Id., at 602,93 A.2d at 5.
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the procuring spouse from pleading the invalidity of the Mexican decree,
especially where all interested parties have acted in reliance on that
decree.
Where both spouses have personally appeared in the Mexican action,
they certainly had the opportunity at that time to litigate the question
of jurisdiction.
Another method of treating Mexican divorces would be to give
them the same effect in the United States that they would have in Mexican
state or federal courts.' As has been indicated before, lax practices
of the state courts are being eliminated. This would mean that American
courts would have to delve into Mexican law to determine the effect of
the Mexican divorce according to the applicable Mexican law. Although
they have shown, with few exceptions, an extreme reluctance to do so,
our courts could then give meaning to the doctrine of comity with a
freer judicial conscience.
And finally, should there be a "moral difference between a person
in moderate circumstances securing a Mexican decree and a more affluent
person securing a Nevada divorce .... It would disregard the fact that in
our society Mexican and Nevada divorces both pose as being more or
less respectable and representative of the mores of the day."' 07
Hilery Silverman.
INSURANCE-DETERMINATION OF TOTAL
DISABILITY
In general the courts experience difficulty in determining what is
total disability within the meaning of insurance disability clauses; this is
due in part to variations in the language of the disability provisions, which
in many instances are circumscribed and restricted by qualifying words
and phrases, and in part to the variant factors in the individual situations
to which the courts are asked to apply disability provisions.
It has long been the rule that the total disability contemplated
by an accident policy, or a life insurance policy containing a disability
clause,' does not mean a state of absolute helplessness,2 but rather an
106. Vieira, Efectos de las sentencias de divorcio el los paises ntranieros, 3 RIVIsT
Dr LA FACULTAD DE DERECnO Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES 557, 569 (Uraguay 1953) (Suggest-
ing that recognition be granted only to divorce decrees rendered by courts competent
"according to international principles").
107. Petition of R_ ., 56 F. Supp. 969, 971 (D.C. Mass. 1944).I. A typical disability clause reads: "Benefits will, be paid when insured has be-
come totally disabled as the result of bodily injury or disease occuring after the issuance
of this agreement, so as to he prevented from engaging in any business or occupation
and performing any work for compensation, gain or profit."
2. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bird, 152 Fla. 532, 12 So.2d 454 (1943); Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y of U.S. v. McKeithan, 160 Fla. 486, 160 So. 883 (1935); Ayers v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 219 La. 945, 54 So.2d 409 (1951); Carver v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 191 Va. 265, 60 S.E.2d 865 (1950).
